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Affinity One Security Solutions Tel 08000 336 999 Specialist in Burglar Alarms, CCTV and Security Solutions Affinity One Security Solutions
Tel 08000 336 999 Specialist in Burglar Alarms, CCTV and Security Solutions BURGLARY:PRACTICE MESSAGES FROM THE BRITISH CRIME SURVEY July 20011. A Publication of the Policing and Reducing Crime UnitHome Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate4th Floor, Clive House, Petty France, London SW1H 9HD1 The recorded crime figure for 1999 is an estimate based on counting rules SummaryThis report draws on data from recent sweeps of theBritish Crime Survey (BCS), presenting those findingsthat have implications for the reduction of domestic
burglary. Affinity One Security Solutions Tel 08000 336 999
The report:
Identifies areas and households with particularlyhigh risks of burglary victimisation;_ considers the extent of repeat victimisation;_ examines how burglars gain entry to homes;identifying the highest risk households and highburglary areas. Affinity One Security Solutions Tel 08000 336 999 The BCS shows what types of household and area aremost at risk of burglary nationally. Assuming localpatterns reflect the national picture, the BCS findingsare a good indication where to begin looking for localproblems. Practitioners should be aware that justtargeting high-risk areas will neglect individualhouseholds at high risk in areas of generally low risk.Conversely, just targeting households whosecharacteristics make them vulnerable would neglecthouseholds whose characteristics would mean that theywere at little risk, were it not for the fact that they arelocated in high crime areas. Thus local strategies needto respond to the risk picture as a whole, giving attentionto both individual and area risks. Affinity One Security Solutions Tel 08000 336 999 Households at risk For example, students suffer just over doublethe national rate with 13 burglaries per 100 studenthouseholds. Households of these types merit attentionin any burglary reduction programme aspiring to becomprehensive. Affinity One Security Solutions Tel 08000 336 999 Historically, it has been difficult for the police, havingrecognised the existence of high-risk groups, to locatethem efficiently. Some types of high-risk household remaindifficult for the police to identify. Partner organisations maybe able to help in this respect. Providers of tertiaryeducation can identify student households, while Localauthorities and housing associations may aid theidentification of social housing. S115 of the Crime andDisorder Act 1998 was intended to facilitate the exchangeof information in the pursuit of crime reduction. Affinity One Security Solutions Tel 08000 336 999 Identifying areas The BCS is able to indicate what types of area are mostlikely to have a high burglary rate. Thus, althoughanalysis of specific areas with chronically high rates ofburglary is best done locally, the BCS can suggest thearea characteristics usually associated with high rates.Using the well-known ACORN area classification (seeBox 3) the BCS indicates types of area with particularlyhigh domestic burglary risks. Those with risks betweentwo and three times the national average are listed inTable 1, which shows the number of burglaries per 100households and how much they differ from the nationalaverage. For instance, areas characterised by councilflats and high levels of unemployment had 23.2burglaries per 100 households, or just over three timesthe national average (indexed risk in Table 1).Using ACORN to identify high-risk areas is an approachto consider. The commercial supplier of ACORN (seeBox 3 for contact details) can identify the ACORN typesof enumeration districts in police force areas. This couldindicate geographic areas where risks are likely to behigh. Alternatively, police forces may feel that Table 1 ofitself gives enough information to choose areas to checkagainst the national experience reflected in BCS.Households within areasBoth household and area characteristics are associatedwith levels of burglary risk. Further analysis of BCS datahas indicated that while crime risks are relatively evenlyspread across different types of household in affluentareas, in poorer areas crime risks are higher for themore affluent households within the area (see forexample, Trickett et al., 1995). Affinity One Security Solutions Tel 08000 336 999 Targeting those at risk BCS findings provide some guidance as to where localproblems may be concentrated. However, the results donot indicate why such households or areas have higherrisks. It is important to establish what factors are mostinfluential in increasing risk in considering the design ofan effective burglary reduction initiative. For example,low-income households may be at risk because of poorsecurity levels, some council properties may have weakdoors or windows, while the layout of terraced housingFigure 1: Households at high risk of burglary in 1999 _ evaluates the effectiveness of home securitydevices.The findings are directly relevant to police and crimereduction partnership practice, in that they identifygroups and circumstances which could profitably act asthe focus for local analysis and prevention priorities.Much of the statistical information in this note wascontained in the main report on the 2000 British CrimeSurvey (BCS – see Kershaw et al. (2000)), but heremore explicit links are made between BCS results andimplications for local crime reduction practice.Analogous notes on violence (Mattinson, 2001) andvehicle-related thefts (Kinshott, 2001) have also beenpublished. Affinity One Security Solutions Tel 08000 336 999 The BCS asks respondents whether they or theirhousehold have been a victim of crime since thebeginning of the previous year. The BCS includes, inaddition to crimes recorded by the police, those notreported to the police or recorded by them. It thusprovides a more complete picture of domestic burglarythan police figures alone and is important in showing towhat extent changes in the level of recorded burglaryreflect changes in rates of reporting or recording. TheBCS estimates that a quarter of burglaries with entry anda half of attempted burglaries were not reported to thepolice in 1999. Box 1 provides further information aboutthe BCS. For more detailed BCS domestic burglaryresults see Budd (1999) and Kershaw et al. (2000). Affinity One Security Solutions Tel 08000 336 999 How big is the problem? Burglary is a high volume crime, affecting around one intwenty-five households annually. The BCS estimatesthat there were 1.28 million domestic burglaries inEngland and Wales in 1999, almost one in ten of thecrimes measured by the survey. Of these, just over500,000 were attempts. In about 750,000 cases entrywas gained, including 540,000 incidents where propertywas stolen. Property stolen was worth £680 million.The number of domestic burglaries has fallen in recentyears, reversing the increases of the 1980s and early1990s. The BCS estimates a 27% fall between 1995 and1999, while police recorded crime figures show a fall ofabout 30% over the same period.1 The Government hasset a target of a 25% reduction in domestic burglarybetween 1999 and 2005. Details of the Home OfficeReducing Burglary Initiative are given in Box 2. Affinity One Security Solutions Tel 08000 336 999 Identifying those at high risk Less than 1% of households in England and Walesaccounted for 42% of all burglaries in 1999. It is clearlycost-effective to target burglary reduction initiatives onthose most at risk, and this targeting will form anelement of many successful burglary reductioninitiatives. There are several approaches which policeforces and crime reduction partnerships may choose toadopt in identifying high-risk households._ One approach is to identify localities where the riskof burglary is high and to target crime reductionmeasures on all households in the identified areas._ A second approach is to identify the types ofhousehold at high risk and target only these,wherever they are. An example of such ‘virtualcommunities’ would be student households.
_ Combining both approaches would involve Affinity One Security Solutions Tel 08000 336 999
for example, public alleyways at the rear of properties)may make life easier for the burglar. An evaluation ofhousing estates in West Yorkshire indicated that estateswhich adopted Secure by Design standards (forexample, minimum levels of physical security,maximising natural surveillance, and minimisingaccess/egress points) had lower incidence of recordedcrime than other estates (Armitage, 2000). Tackling repeat victimisation One of the best predictors of the risk of a householdbeing burgled is whether it has had a burglary in therecent past. Prior victimisation is particularly usefulbecause this is information that the police acquireroutinely. Action in the wake of a burglary combineselements of both victim support and targeted crimeprevention. This action does not have to be restricted tothe burgled home, since there is recent evidence (Shawand Pease, 2000) that elevated risk of burglary isshared by approximately three homes on either side ofa burgled dwelling.The BCS shows that a fifth of burglary victims in 1999had been burgled at least once before in the same year;7% had been burgled more than twice in the year. This islikely to be a much higher figure than the police knowabout because of unreported burglaries. The practicalimplication here is that the first officer attending a burglaryincident could profitably ask whether previous crimes hadbeen committed against the same dwelling, or againstoccupants in ways which might be linked to the burglary.Research has indicated that victims are most likely to bere-victimised shortly after the first incident (Polvi, 1991,Robinson, 1998). It also shows that offenders whocommit repeated crimes against the same target are ingeneral more prolific offenders (Everson, 2000; Eversonand Pease, 2001) This adds to the case for targetingsuch offences and increased efforts in detecting thosewho commit them. Pease (1998) reviews the crimeprevention implications of repeat victimisation.Repeat victimisation offers a prime opportunity forhighly targeted burglary reduction initiatives. Strategiesinclude (see Farrell et al., 2000):_ Crime prevention officers advising victims onsecurity improvements, for example, upgradinglocks or removing trees or shrubs that give anoffender cover._ Guidance being given to neighbours about theneed for extra vigilance, and the concentration ofpolice patrolling around the burglary site for somedays or weeks after a crime._ Fitting covert alarms to victimised households inorder to alert the police if there is an attempt toburgle the home again. This could assist in theapprehension of prolific burglars, if the police areable to respond quickly enough. However, thisapproach does require householders to be leftvulnerable for a period to be effective. Modus operandi Establishing how burglars operate is particularlyimportant in terms of advice about crime preventionmeasures. It may also provide a baseline against whichto measure local experience, including prolific offendersusing unusual techniques. The BCS paints a nationalpicture - but the findings provide useful pointers for localaction.When burglaries occurThe BCS suggests that burglaries are as likely to occurat weekends as during the week.2 Weekend burglarieswere most likely to take place during the evening ornight (6pm to 6am) – two-thirds did so. Weekdayburglaries were more evenly spread – around a half tookplace during the morning or afternoon and a half in theevening or night. Burglaries were more likely to result insuccessful entry if they occurred during the day. 68% ofdaytime burglaries resulted in entry, compared with 55%of burglaries that took place during the evening or night.Method of entryIn most burglaries where entry is gained, the offenderuses some form of force. The BCS estimates that:
ACORN area Incident rate per Indexed risk 100 households Affinity One Security Solutions Tel 08000 336 999
Council flats, very high unemployment, singles 23.2 3.1Multi-occupied terraces, multi-ethnic areas 23.0 3.1Council areas, high unemployment, lone parents 21.3 2.8Academic centres, students and young professionals 19.7 2.6Council flats, greatest hardship, many lone parents 18.4 2.4Furnished flats and bedsits, younger single people 18.2 2.4Council areas, residents with health problems 15.5 2.1National average (1995, 1997, 1999) 7.5 1.0Note: References Armitage, R. (2000). An Evaluation of Secured by Design Housing within West Yorkshire. Home Office Briefing Note7/00. London: Home Office.Budd, T. (1999). Burglary of Domestic Dwellings: Findings from the British Crime Survey. Home Office StatisticalBulletin 4/99. London: Home Office.Curtin, L., Tilley, N., Owen, M. and Pease, K. (2001) Developing Crime Reduction Plans: Some examples from theReducing Burglary Initiative. Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 7. London: Home Office.Everson, S. (2000) Repeat Offending and Repeat Victimisation. Unpub PhD thesis, Univ. of Huddersfield.Everson, S. and Pease, K. (2001). ‘Crime Against the Same Person and Place: Detection Opportunity and OffenderTargeting’. In Farrell, G. and Pease, K. Repeat Victimisation. Monsey NY: Criminal Justice Press.Farrell, G., Edmunds, A., Hobbs, L. and Laycock, G. (2000) RV Snapshot: UK Policing and Repeat Victimisation.Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 5. London: Home Office.Kershaw, C., Budd, T., Kinshott, G., Mattinson, J., Mayhew, M. and Myhill, A. (2000) The 2000 British Crime Survey:England and Wales, Home Office Statistical Bulletin 18/00. London: Home Office.Kinshott, G. (2001). Vehicle Related Thefts: Practice Messages from the British Crime Survey. Briefing Note 6/01.Home Office: London.Mattinson, J. (2001). Stranger and Acquaintance Violence: Practice Messages from the British Crime Survey.Briefing Note 7/01. Home Office: London.Pease, K. (1998). Repeat Victimisation: Taking Stock. PRG Crime Detection and Prevention Paper 90. London:Home Office.Polvi, N. (1991). The Time Course of Repeat Burglary Victimisation, British Journal of Criminology, 31: 411-414.Robinson, M. B. (1998) Burglary Revictimisation: The Time Period of Heightened Risk. British Journal of Criminology,38, 78-87.Shaw, M. and Pease, K. (2000). Repeat Victimisation in Scotland. Edinburgh: Scottish Executive.Trickett, A., Osborn, D. R., and Ellingworth, D. (1995). Property Crime Victimisation: the Roles of Individual and AreaInfluences, International Review of Victimology, 3: 273-295. Acknowledgements Thanks are also due to colleagues within RDS and Prof. Ken Pease of Huddersfield University who providedvaluable comments on an earlier drafts of this note.Papers in the Police Research, Reducing Crime, Special Interest Series and other PRC ad hoc publications are availablefree of charge from: Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, Communications Development Unit,Room 275, Home Office, 50 Queen Anne's Gate, London SW1H 9AT. Facsimile no 020 7222 0211
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